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Abstract. We construct new families of elliptic curves over Fp2 with efficiently
computable endomorphisms, which can be used to accelerate elliptic curve-
based cryptosystems in the sameway asGallant–Lambert–Vanstone (GLV) and
Galbraith–Lin–Scott (GLS) endomorphisms. Our construction is based on re-
ducingQ-curves—curves over quadratic number fields without complex mul-
tiplication, butwith isogenies to their Galois conjugates—modulo inert primes.
As a first application of the general theory we construct, for every p > 3, two
one-parameter families of elliptic curves over Fp2 equipped with endomor-
phisms that are faster than doubling. Like GLS (which appears as a degenerate
case of our construction), we offer the advantage over GLV of selecting from
a much wider range of curves, and thus finding secure group orders when p
is fixed. Unlike GLS, we also offer the possibility of constructing twist-secure
curves. Among our examples are prime-order curves equipped with fast en-
domorphisms, with almost-prime-order twists, over Fp2 for p = 2127 −1 and
p = 2255−19.
Keywords: Elliptic curve cryptography, endomorphisms, GLV, GLS, exponentiation,
scalar multiplication, Q-curves.
1 Introduction
Let E be an elliptic curve over a finite field Fq , and let G ⊂ E (Fq ) be a cyclic sub-
group of prime order N . When implementing cryptographic protocols using G , the
fundamental operation is scalar multiplication (or exponentiation):
Given P in G andm in Z, compute [m]P := P ⊕·· ·⊕P︸ ︷︷ ︸
m times
.
The literature on general scalar multiplication algorithms is vast, and we will not
explore it in detail here (see [11, §2.8,§11.2] and [5, Chapter 9] for introductions to
exponentiation andmultiexponentiation algorithms). For our purposes, it suffices to
note that the dominant factor in scalar multiplication time using conventional algo-
rithms is the bitlength ofm. As a basic example, ifG is a generic cyclic abelian group,
then we may compute [m]P using a variant of the binary method, which requires at
most ⌈log2m⌉ doublings and (in the worst case) about as many addings in G .
But elliptic curves are not generic groups: they have a rich and concrete geo-
metric structure, which should be exploited for fun and profit. For example, endo-
morphisms of elliptic curves may be used to accelerate generic scalar multiplication
algorithms, and thus to accelerate basic operations in curve-based cryptosystems.
Suppose E is equipped with an efficient endomorphism ψ, defined over Fq . By
efficient, we mean that we can compute the image ψ(P ) of any point P in E (Fq ) for
the cost ofO(1) operations in Fq . In practice, we want this to cost nomore than a few
doublings in E (Fq ).
Assume ψ(G ) ⊆ G , or equivalently, that ψ restricts to an endomorphism of G .1
Now G is a finite cyclic group, isomorphic to Z/NZ; and every endomorphism of
Z/NZ is just an integer multiplication modulo N . Hence,ψ acts on G as multiplica-
tion by some integer eigenvalue λψ: that is,
ψ|G = [λψ]G .
The eigenvalue λψ must be a root in Z/NZ of the characteristic polynomial ofψ.
Returning to the problem of scalar multiplication: we want to compute [m]P .
Rewritingm as
m = a+bλψ (mod N )
for some a and b, we can compute [m]P using the relation
[m]P = [a]P + [bλψ]P = [a]P + [b]ψ(P )
and a two-dimensional multiexponentation such as Straus’s algorithm [26], which
requires has a loop length of log2 ‖(a,b)‖∞ (ie, log2 ‖(a,b)‖∞ doubles and as many
adds; recall that ‖(a,b)‖∞ = max(|a|, |b|)). If λψ is not too small, then we can eas-
ily find (a,b) such that log2 ‖(a,b)‖∞ is roughly half of log2N . (We remove the “If”
and the “roughly” for our ψ in §4.) The endomorphism lets us replace conventional
log2N-bit scalar multiplications with
1
2 log2N-bit multiexponentiations. In terms of
basic binary methods, we are halving the loop length, cutting the number of dou-
blings in half.
Of course, in practice we are not halving the execution time. The precise speedup
ratio depends on a variety of factors, including the choice of exponentiation and
multiexponentiation algorithms, the cost of computing ψ, the shortness of a and b
on the average, and the cost of doublings and addings in terms of bit operations—to
say nothing of the cryptographic protocol, which may prohibit some other conven-
tional speedups. For example: in [12], Galbraith, Lin, and Scott report experiments
where cryptographic operations on GLS curves required between 70% and 83% of
the time required for the previous best practice curves—with the variation depend-
ing on the architecture, the underyling point arithmetic, and the protocol.
1 This assumption is satisfied almost by default in the context of old-school discrete log-
based cryptosystems. If ψ(G ) 6⊆ G , then E [N](Fq ) = G +ψ(G ) ∼= (Z/NZ)2, so N2 | #E (Fq )
and N | q−1; such E are cryptographically inefficient, and discrete logs in G are vulnerable
to the Menezes–Okamoto–Vanstone reduction [21]. However, these G do arise naturally in
pairing-based cryptography; in that context the assumption should be verified carefully.
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To put this technique into practice, we need a source of cryptographic elliptic
curves equipped with efficient endomorphisms. To date, in the large characteristic
case2, there have been essentially only two constructions:
1. The classic Gallant–Lambert–Vanstone (GLV) construction [13]. Elliptic curves
over number fieldswith explicit complexmultiplicationbyCM-orderswith small
discriminants are reducedmodulo suitable primes p; an explicit endomorphism
on the CM curve reduces to an efficient endomorphism over the finite field.
2. The more recent Galbraith–Lin–Scott (GLS) construction [12]. Here, curves over
Fp are viewed over Fp2 ; the p-power sub-Frobenius induces an extremely effi-
cient endomorphism on the quadratic twist (which can have prime order).
These two constructions have since been combined to give 3- and 4-dimensional
variants [18,30], and extended to hyperelliptic curves in a variety of ways [3,17,24,27].
However, basic GLV and GLS remain the archetypal constructions.
Our contribution: new families of endomorphisms. In this work, we propose a new
source of elliptic curves over Fp2 with efficient endomorphisms: quadraticQ-curves.
Definition 1. A quadratic Q-curve of degree d is an elliptic curve E without com-
plex multiplication, defined over a quadratic number field K , such that there exists
an isogeny of degree d from E to its Galois conjugate σE , where 〈σ〉 = Gal(K /Q). (The
Galois conjugate σE is the curve formed by applying σ to all of the coefficients of E .)
Q-curves are well-established objects of interest in number theory, where they
have formed a natural setting for generalizations of the Shimura–Taniyama conjec-
ture. Ellenberg’s survey [9] gives an excellent introduction to this beautiful theory.
Our application of quadratic Q-curves is rather more prosaic: given a d-isogeny
E˜ → σE˜ over a quadratic field, we reduce modulo an inert prime p to obtain an
isogeny E → σE over Fp2 .We then exploit the fact that the p-power Frobenius isogeny
maps σE back onto E ; composing with the reduced d-isogeny, we obtain an endo-
morphism of E of degree dp. For efficiency reasons, d must be small; it turns out
that for small values of d , we can write down one-parameter families of Q-curves
(our approach below was inspired by the explicit techniques of Hasegawa [15]). We
thus obtain one-parameter families of elliptic curves over Fp2 equippedwith efficient
non-integer endomorphisms. For these endomorphisms we can give convenient ex-
plicit formulæ for short scalar decompositions (see §4).
For concrete examples, we concentrate on the cases d = 2 and 3 (in §5 and §6,
respectively), where the endomorphism is more efficient than a single doubling (we
briefly discuss higher degrees in §10). For maximum generality and flexibility, we de-
fine our curves in short Weierstrass form; but we include transformations to Mont-
gomery, twisted Edwards, and Doche–Icart–Kohel models where appropriate in §8.
Comparison with GLV. Like GLV, our method involves reducing curves defined over
number fields to obtain curves over finite fields with explicit complexmultiplication.
2 We are primarily interested in the large characteristic case, where q = p or p2; so we will
not discuss τ-adic/Frobenius expansion-style techniques here.
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However, we emphasise a profound difference: in our method, the curves over the
number fields generally do not have complex multiplication themselves.
GLV curves are necessarily isolated examples—and the really useful examples are
extremely limited in number (see [18, App. A] for a list of curves). The scarcity of GLV
curves3 is their Achilles’ heel: as noted in [12], if p is fixed then there is no guar-
antee that there will exist a GLV curve with prime (or almost-prime) order over Fp .
Consider the situation discussed in [12, §1]: the most efficient GLV curves have CM
discriminants−3 and−4. If we areworking at a 128-bit security level, then the choice
p = 2255−19 allows particularly fast arithmetic in Fp . But the largest prime factor of
the order of a curve over Fp with CM discriminant −4 (resp. −3) has 239 (resp. 230)
bits: using these curves wastes 9 (resp. 13) potential bits of security. In fact, we are
lucky withD =−3 and−4: for all of the other discriminants offering endomorphisms
of degree at most 3, we can do no better than a 95-bit prime factor, which represents
a catastrophic 80-bit loss of relative security.
In contrast, our construction yields true families of curves, covering ∼ p isomor-
phism classes over Fp2 . This gives us a vastly higher probability of finding prime (or
almost-prime)-order curves over practically important fields.
Comparison with GLS. Like GLS, we construct curves over Fp2 equipped with an in-
separable endomorphism. While these curves are not defined over the prime field,
the fact that the extension degree is only 2 means that Weil descent attacks offer no
advantage when solving DLP instances (see [12, §9]). And like GLS, our families offer
around p distinct isomorphism classes of curves, making it easy to find secure group
orders when p is fixed.
But unlike GLS, our curves have j -invariants in Fp2 : they are not isomorphic to
or twists of subfield curves. This allows us to find twist-secure curves, which are re-
sistant to the Fouque–Lercier–Réal–Valette fault attack [10]. As we will see in §9, our
construction reduces to GLS in the degenerate case d = 1 (that is, where φ˜ is an iso-
morphism). Our construction is therefore a sort of generalized GLS—though it is not
the higher-degree generalization anticipated byGalbraith, Lin, and Scott themselves,
which composes the sub-Frobenius with a non-rational separable homomorphism
and its dual homomorphism (cf. [12, Theorem 1]).
In §4, we prove that we can immediately obtain decompositions of the same
bitlength as GLS for curves over the same fields: the decompositions produced by
our Proposition 2 are identical to the GLS decompositions of [12, Lemma 2] when
3 The scarcity of useful GLV curves is easily explained: efficient separable endomorphisms
have extremely small degree (so that the dense defining polynomials can be evaluated
quickly). But the degree of the endomorphism is the norm of the corresponding element
of the CM-order; and to have non-integers of very small norm, the CM-order must have
a tiny discriminant. Up to twists, the number of elliptic curves with CM discriminant D is
the Kronecker class number h(D), which is inO(
p
D). Of course, for the tiny values of D in
question, the asymptotics of h(D) are irrelevant; for the six D corresponding to endomor-
phisms of degree at most 3, we have h(D) = 1, so there is only one j -invariant. For D =−4
(corresponding to j = 1728) there are two or four twists over Fp ; forD =−3 (corresponding
to j = 0) we have two or six, and otherwise we have only two. In particular, there are atmost
18 distinct curves over Fp with a non-integer endomorphism of degree at most 3.
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d = 1, up to sign. For this reason, we do not provide extensive implementation de-
tails in this paper: while our endomorphisms cost a few more Fq -operations to eval-
uate than the GLS endomorphism, this evaluation is typically carried out only once
per scalar multiplication. This evaluation is the only difference between a GLS scalar
multiplication and one of ours: the subsequent multiexponentiations have exactly
the same length as in GLS, and the underlying curve and field arithmetic is the same,
too.
2 Notation and conventions
Throughout, we work over fields of characteristic not 2 or 3. Let
E : y2 = x3+a2x2+a4x+a6
be an elliptic curve over such a field K .
Galois conjugates. For every automorphism σ of K , we define the conjugate curve
σ
E : y2 = x3+σa2x2+σa4x+σa6.
Ifφ : E → E1 is an isogeny, then we obtain a conjugate isogeny σφ : σE → σE1 by apply-
ing σ to the defining equations of φ, E , and E1.
Quadratic twists. For every λ 6= 0 in K×, we define a twisting isomorphism
δ(λ) : E −→ E λ : y2 = x3+λ2a2x2+λ4a4x+λ6a6
by
δ(λ) : (x, y) 7−→ (λ2x,λ3y).
The twist E λ is defined over K (λ2), and δ(λ) is defined over K (λ). For every K -endo-
morphismψ of E , there is a K (λ2)-endomorphism ψλ = δ(λ)ψδ(λ−1) of E λ. Observe
that δ(λ1)δ(λ2)= δ(λ1λ2) for any λ1,λ2 in K , and δ(−1)= [−1]. Also, σ(E λ)= σE
σλ for
all automorphisms σ of K .
If µ is a nonsquare in K , then E
p
µ is called a quadratic twist. If K = Fq , then
E
p
µ1 and E
p
µ2 are Fq -isomorphic for all nonsquares µ1, µ2 in Fq (the isomorphism
δ(
√
µ1/µ2) is defined over Fq because µ1/µ2 must be a square). When the choice of
nonsquare is not important, we denote the quadratic twist by E ′. Similarly, if ψ is
an Fq -endomorphism of E , then ψ′ is the corresponding Fq -endomorphism of E ′.
(Conjugates are marked by left-superscripts, twists by right-superscripts.)
The trace. If K = Fq , then πE denotes the q-power Frobenius endomorphism of E .
Recall that the characteristic polynomial of πE has the form
χE (T )= T 2− tr(E )T +q, with |tr(E )| ≤ 2
p
q .
The integer tr(E ) is the trace of E ; we have #E (Fq )= q+1− tr(E ) and tr(E ′)=−tr(E ).
p-th powering. We write (p) for the p-th powering automorphism of Fp . Note that
(p) is almost trivial to compute on Fp2 = Fp (
p
∆), because (p)(a+b
p
∆)= a−b
p
∆ for
all a and b in Fp .
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3 QuadraticQ-curves and their reductions
Suppose E˜ /Q(
p
∆) is a quadratic Q-curve of prime degree d (cf. Definition 1), where
∆ is a discriminant prime to d , and let φ˜ : E˜ → σE˜ be the corresponding d-isogeny.
In general, φ˜ is only defined over a quadratic extension Q(
p
∆,γ) of Q(
p
∆). We can
compute γ from ∆ and ker φ˜ using [14, Proposition 3.1], but after a suitable twist we
can always reduce to the case where γ =
p
±d (see [14, remark after Lemma 3.2]).
The families of explicit Q-curves of degree d that we treat below have their isogenies
defined overQ(
p
∆,
p
−d); so to simplify matters, from now on we will
Assume φ˜ is defined over Q(
p
∆,
p
−d ).
Let p be a prime of good reduction for E˜ that is inert in Q(
p
∆) and prime to d . If
O∆ is the ring of integers ofQ(
p
∆), then
Fp2 =O∆/(p)= Fp (
p
∆).
Looking at the Galois groups of our fields, we have a series of injections
〈(p)〉 =Gal(Fp (
p
∆)/Fp ) ,→Gal(Q(
p
∆)/Q) ,→Gal(Q(
p
∆,
p
−d)/Q).
The image of (p) in Gal(Q(
p
∆)/Q) is σ, because p is inert inQ(
p
∆). When extending
σ to an automorphism of Q(
p
∆,
p
−d ), we extend it to be the image of (p): that is,
σ
(
α+β
p
∆+γ
p
−d +δ
p
−d∆
)
=α−β
p
∆+
(
−d
/
p
)(
γ
p
−d −δ
p
−d∆
)
(3.1)
for all α,β,γ, and δ ∈Q. (Recall that the Legendre symbol
(
n
/
p
)
is 1 if n is a square
mod p, −1 if n is not a square mod p, and 0 if p divides n.)
Now let E be the reductionmodulo p of E˜ . The curve σE˜ reduces to (p)E , while the
d-isogeny φ˜ : E˜ → σE˜ reduces to a d-isogeny φ : E → (p)E defined over Fp2 .
Applying σ to φ˜, we obtain a second d-isogeny σφ˜ : σE˜ → E˜ travelling in the op-
posite direction, which reducesmod p to a conjugate isogeny (p)φ : (p)E → E over Fp2 .
Composing σφ˜ with φ˜ yields endomorphisms σφ˜◦ φ˜ of E˜ and φ˜◦σφ˜ of σE˜ , each of de-
gree d2. But (by definition) E˜ and σE˜ do not have complex multiplication, so all of
their endomorphisms are integer multiplications; and since the only integer multi-
plications of degree d2 are [d] and [−d], we can conclude that
σφ˜◦ φ˜= [ǫpd]E˜ and φ˜◦σφ˜= [ǫpd]σE˜ , where ǫp ∈ {±1}.
Technically, σφ˜ and (p)φ are—up to sign—the dual isogenies of φ˜ and φ, respectively.
The sign ǫp depends on p (as well as on φ˜): if τ is the extension of σ to Q(
p
∆,
p
−d)
that is not the image of (p), then τφ˜◦ φ˜= [−ǫpd]E˜ . Reducing mod p, we see that
(p)φ◦φ= [ǫpd]E and φ◦ (p)φ= [ǫpd](p)E . (3.2)
The map (x, y) 7→ (xp , yp ) defines p-isogenies
π0 :
(p)
E −→ E and (p)π0 : E −→ (p)E .
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Clearly, (p)π0 ◦π0 (resp. π0 ◦ (p)π0) is the p2-power Frobenius endomorphism of E
(resp. (p)E ). Composing π0 with φ yields a degree-pd endomorphism
ψ := π0 ◦φ ∈ End(E ).
If d is very small—say, less than 10—then ψ is efficient because φ is defined by poly-
nomials of degree about d , and π0 acts as a simple conjugation on coordinates in
Fp2 , as in Eq. (3.1). (The efficiency ofψ depends primarily on its separable degree, d ,
and not on the inseparable part p.)
We also obtain an endomorphism ψ′ on the quadratic twist E ′ of E . Indeed, if
E
′ = E
p
µ, thenψ′ =ψ
p
µ, andψ′ is defined over Fp2 .
Proposition 1. With the notation above:
ψ2 = [ǫpd]πE and (ψ′)2 = [−ǫpd]πE ′ .
There exists an integer r satisfying dr 2 = 2p+ǫp tr(E ) such that
ψ= 1r
(
πE +ǫpp
)
and ψ′ = −1r
(
πE ′ −ǫpp
)
.
The characteristic polynomial of bothψ andψ′ is
Pψ(T )=Pψ′ (T )= T 2−ǫp rdT +dp.
Proof. Clearly, π0 ◦φ= (p)φ◦ (p)π0. Hence
ψ2 =π0 ◦φ◦π0 ◦φ=π0 ◦φ◦ (p)φ◦ (p)π0 = π0[ǫpd](p)π0 = [ǫpd]π0(p)π0 = [ǫpd]πE .
Choosing a nonsquare µ in Fp2 , so E
′ = E
p
µ andψ′ =ψ
p
µ, we find
(ψ′)2 = δ(µ1/2)◦ψ2 ◦δ(µ−1/2)= δ(µ1/2)◦ [ǫpd]πE ◦δ(µ−1/2)
= δ(µ(1−p2)/2)[ǫpd]πE ′ = δ(−1)[ǫpd]πE ′ = [−ǫpd]πE ′
Using the relations π2
E
−tr(E )πE +p2 = 0 and π2E ′+tr(E )πE ′+p2 = 0, we verify that the
expressions for ψ and ψ′ give the two square roots of ǫpdπE in Q(πE ), and −ǫpdπE ′
in Q(π′
E
), and that the claimed characteristic polynomial is satisfied. ⊓⊔
Nowwe just need a source of quadraticQ-curves of small degree. Elkies [8] shows
that allQ-curves correspond to rational points on certainmodular curves: Let X ∗(d)
be the quotient of the modular curve X0(d) by all of its Atkin–Lehner involutions,
let K be a quadratic field, and let σ be the involution of K over Q. If e is a point in
X ∗(d)(Q) and E is a preimage of e in X0(d)(K )\X0(d)(Q), then E parametrizes (up to
Q-isomorphism) a d-isogeny φ˜ : E˜ → σE˜ over K .
Luckily enough, for very smalld , the curves X0 (d) and X ∗(d) have genus zero—so
not only do we get plenty of rational points on X ∗(d), we get a whole one-parameter
family of Q-curves of degree d . Hasegawa gives explicit universal curves for d = 2, 3,
and 7 in [15, Theorem 2.2]: for each squarefree integer ∆ 6= 1, everyQ-curve of degree
d = 2,3,7 over Q(
p
∆) is Q-isomorphic to a rational specialization of one of these
families. Hasegawa’s curves for d = 2 and 3 (E˜2,∆,s in §5 and E˜3,∆,s in §6) suffice not
only to illustrate our ideas, but also to give useful practical examples.
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4 Short scalar decompositions
Before moving on to concrete constructions, we will show that the endomorphisms
developed in §3 yield short scalar decompositions. Proposition 2 below gives explicit
formulæ for producing decompositions of at most ⌈log2p⌉ bits.
Suppose G is a cyclic subgroup of E (Fp2 ) such that ψ(G ) = G , and let N = #G .
Proposition 1 shows thatψ acts as a square root of ǫpd on G : its eigenvalue is
λψ ≡ (1+ǫpp)/r (mod N ). (4.1)
We want to compute a decomposition
m = a+bλψ (mod N )
so as to efficiently compute
[m]P = [a]P + [bλψ]P = [a]P + [b]ψ(P ).
The decomposition ofm is not unique: far from it. The set of all decompositions
(a,b) ofm is the coset (m,0)+L , where
L := 〈(N ,0), (−λψ,1)〉 ⊂Z2
is the lattice of decompositions of 0 (that is, of (a,b) such that a+bλψ ≡ 0 (mod N )).
We want to find a decomposition where a and b have minimal bitlength: that
is, where ⌈log2 ‖(a,b)‖∞⌉ is as small as possible. The standard technique is to (pre)-
compute a short basis of L , then use Babai rounding [1] to transform each scalarm
into a short decomposition (a,b). The following lemma outlines this process; for fur-
ther detail and analysis, see [13, §4] and [11, §18.2].
Lemma 1. Let e1,e2 be linearly independent vectors inL . Let m be an integer, and set
(a,b) := (m,0)−⌊α⌉e1−⌊β⌉e2,
where (α,β) is the (unique) solution inQ2 to the linear system (m,0)=αe1+βe2. Then
m ≡ a+λψb (mod N ) and ‖(a,b)‖∞ ≤max(‖e1‖∞,‖e2‖∞) .
Proof. This is just [13, Lemma 2] (under the infinity norm). ⊓⊔
We see that better decompositions ofm correspond to shorter bases forL . If |λψ|
is not unusually small, then we can compute a basis for L of size O(
p
N ) using the
Gauss reduction or Euclidean algorithms (cf. [13, §4] and [11, §17.1.1]).4 The basis
depends only on N and λψ, so it can be precomputed.
In our case, lattice reduction is unnecessary: we can immediately write down two
linearly independent vectors in L that are “short enough”, and thus give explicit for-
mulae for (a,b) in terms ofm. These decompositions have length ⌈log2 p⌉, which is
near-optimal in cryptographic contexts: if N ∼ #E (Fp2 )∼ p2, then log2 p ∼ 12 log2N .
4 Bounds on the constant hidden by theO(
p
N ) are derived in [24], but they are suboptimal
for our endomorphisms. In cryptographic contexts, Proposition 2 gives better results.
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Proposition 2. With the notation above: given an integer m, let
a =m−
⌊
m(1+ǫpp)/#E (Fp2 )
⌉
(1+ǫpp)+
⌊
mr /#E (Fp2 )
⌉
ǫpdr and
b =
⌊
m(1+ǫpp)/#E (Fp2 )
⌉
r −
⌊
mr /#E (Fp2 )
⌉
(1+ǫpp).
Then, assuming d≪ p and m 6≡ 0 (mod N ), we have
m ≡ a+bλψ (mod N ) and ⌈log2 ‖(a,b)‖∞⌉ ≤ ⌈log2 p⌉.
Proof. Eq. (4.1) yields rλψ ≡ 1+ ǫpp (mod N ) and r ǫpd ≡ (1+ ǫpp)λψ (mod N ), so
the vectors e1 = (1+ ǫpp,−r ) and e2 = (−ǫpdr,1+ ǫpp) are in L (they generate a
sublattice of determinant #E (Fp2 )). Applying Lemma 1 with α=m(1+ ǫpp)/#E (Fp2 )
and β =mr /#E (Fp2 ), we see thatm ≡ a+bλψ (mod N ) and ‖(a,b)‖∞ ≤ ‖e2‖∞. But
d |r | ≤ 2
√
dp (since |tr(E )| ≤ 2p) and d ≪ p, so ‖e2‖∞ = p+ ǫp . The result follows on
taking logs, and noting that ⌈log2(p±1)⌉ = ⌈log2 p⌉ (since p > 3). ⊓⊔
5 Endomorphisms from quadraticQ-curves of degree 2
Let ∆ be a squarefree integer. Hasegawa defines a one-parameter family of elliptic
curves overQ(
p
∆) by
E˜2,∆,s : y
2 = x3−6(5−3s
p
∆)x+8(7−9s
p
∆), (5.1)
where s is a free parameter taking values in Q [15, Theorem 2.2]. The discriminant of
E˜2,∆,s is 29 ·36(1− s2∆)(1+ s
p
∆), so the curve E˜2,∆,s has good reduction at every p > 3
with
(
∆
/
p
)
=−1, for every s inQ.
The curve E˜2,∆,s has a rational 2-torsion point (4,0), which generates the kernel of
a 2-isogeny φ˜2,∆,s : E˜2,∆,s → σE˜2,∆,s defined over Q(
p
∆,
p
−2). We construct φ˜2,∆,s ex-
plicitly: Vélu’s formulae [28] define the (normalized) quotient E˜2,∆,s → E˜2,∆,s/〈(4,0)〉,
and then the isomorphism E˜2,∆,s/〈(4,0)〉 → σE˜2,∆,s is the quadratic twist δ(1/
p
−2).
Composing, we obtain an expression for the isogeny as a rational map:
φ˜2,∆,t : (x, y) 7−→
(
−x
2
− 9(1+ s
p
∆)
x−4 ,
yp
−2
(
−1
2
+ 9(1+ s
p
∆)
(x−4)2
))
.
Conjugating and composing,we recognise that σφ˜2,∆,t ◦φ˜2,∆,t = [2] ifσ(
p
−2)=−
p
−2,
and [−2] if σ(
p
−2)=
p
−2: that is, the sign function for φ˜2,∆,t is
ǫp =−
(
−2
/
p
)
=
{
1 if p ≡ 5,7 (mod 8),
−1 if p ≡ 1,3 (mod 8). (5.2)
Theorem1. Let p > 3 be a prime, and define ǫp as in Eq. (5.2). Let ∆ be a nonsquare5
in Fp , so Fp2 = Fp (
p
∆). Let C2,∆ : Fp → Fp2 be the mapping defined by
C2,∆(s) := 9(1+ s
p
∆).
5 The choice of∆ is (theoretically) irrelevant, since all quadratic extensions of Fp are isomor-
phic. If ∆ and ∆′ are two nonsquares in Fp , then ∆/∆′ = a2 for some a in Fp , so E2,∆,t and
E2,∆′,at are identical.We are therefore free to choose any practically convenient value for∆,
such as one permitting faster arithmetic in Fp (
p
∆).
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For each s in Fp , let E2,∆,s be the elliptic curve over Fp2 defined by
E2,∆,s : y
2 = x3+2(C2,∆(s)−24)x−8(C2,∆(s)−16).
Then E2,∆,s has an efficient Fp2 -endomorphism
ψ2,∆,s : (x, y) 7−→
(−xp
2
− C2,∆(s)
p
xp −4 ,
ypp
−2
(−1
2
+ C2,∆(s)
p
(xp −4)2
))
,
of degree 2p, such that
ψ2,∆,s =
1
r
(
πE2,∆,s +ǫpp
)
and ψ22,∆,s = [ǫp2]πE2,∆,s
for some integer r satisfying 2r 2 = 2p + ǫp tr(E2,∆,s ). The characteristic polynomial of
ψ2,∆,s is P2,∆,s (T )= T 2−ǫp rT+2p. The twisted endomorphismψ′2,∆,s on E ′2,∆,s satisfies
ψ′2,∆,s = (−πE ′2,∆,s +ǫpp)/r , and (ψ
′
2,∆,s )
2 = [−ǫp2]πE ′2,∆,s , and P2,∆,s (ψ
′
2,∆,s )= 0.
Proof. Reduce E˜2,∆,s and φ˜2,∆,s mod p and compose with π0 as in §3, then apply
Proposition 1 using Eq. (5.2). ⊓⊔
IfG ⊂ E2,∆,s (Fp2 ) is a cyclic subgroup of orderN such thatψ2,∆,s (G )=G , then the
eigenvalue ofψ2,∆,s on G is
λ2,∆,s =
1
r
(
1+ǫpp
)
≡±
√
ǫp2 (mod N ).
Applying Proposition 2, we can decompose scalar multiplications in G as [m]P =
[a]P + [b]ψ2,∆,s (P ) where a and b have at most ⌈log2 p⌉ bits.
Proposition 3. Theorem 1 yields at least p − 3 non-isomorphic curves (and at least
2p − 6 non-Fp2 -isomorphic curves, if we count the quadratic twists) equipped with
efficient endomorphisms.
Proof. It suffices to show that the j -invariant j
(
E2,∆,s
)
= 26(5−3s
p
∆)3
(1−s2∆)(1+s
p
∆)
takes at least
p−3 distinct values in Fp2 as s ranges over Fp . If j (E2,∆,s )= j (E2,∆,s1 ) with s1 6= s2, then
s1 and s2 satisfy F0(s1, s2)−2
p
∆F1(s1, s2)= 0, where F1(s1, s2)= (s1+s2)(63∆s1s2−65)
and F0(s1, s2)= (∆s1s2+1)(81∆s1s2−175)+49∆(s1 + s2)2 are polynomials over Fp . If
s1 and s2 are in Fp , then we must have F0(s1, s2) = F1(s1, s2) = 0. Solving the simul-
taneous equations, discarding the solutions that can never be in Fp , and dividing by
two (since (s1, s2) and (s2, s1) represent the same collision) yields at most 3 collisions
j (E2,∆,s1 )= j (E2,∆,s2 ) with s1 6= s2 in Fp . ⊓⊔
Weobserve that σE˜2,∆,s = E˜2,∆,−s , sowe do not gain anymore isomorphism classes
in Proposition 3 by including the codomain curves.
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6 Endomorphisms from quadraticQ-curves of degree 3
Let ∆ be a squarefree discriminant; Hasegawa defines a one-parameter family of el-
liptic curves overQ(
p
∆) by
E˜3,∆,s : y
2 = x3−3
(
5+4s
p
∆
)
x+2
(
2s2∆+14s
p
∆+11
)
, (6.1)
where s is a free parameter taking values inQ. As for the curves in §5, the curve E˜3,∆,s
has good reduction at every p > 3 with
(
∆
/
p
)
=−1, for every s in Q.
The curve E˜3,∆,s has a subgroup of order 3 defined by the polynomial x−3, con-
sisting of 0 and (3,±2(1−s
p
∆)). Exactly as in §5, taking the Vélu quotient and twisting
by 1/
p
−3 yields an explicit 3-isogeny φ˜3,∆,s : E˜3,∆,s → σE˜3,∆,s ; its sign function is
ǫp =−
(
−3
/
p
)
=
{
1 if p ≡ 2 (mod 3),
−1 if p ≡ 1 (mod 3). (6.2)
Theorem2. Let p > 3 be a prime, and define ǫp as in Eq. (6.2). Let ∆ be a nonsquare6
in Fp , so Fp2 = Fp (
p
∆). Let C3,∆ : Fp → Fp2 be the mapping defined by
C3,∆(s) := 2(1+ s
p
∆).
For each s in Fp , we let E3,∆,s be the elliptic curve over Fp2 defined by
E3,∆,s : y
2 = x3−3
(
2C3,∆(s)+1
)
x+
(
C3,∆(s)
2+10C3,∆(s)−2
)
.
Then E3,∆,s has an efficient Fp2 -endomorphism
ψ3,∆,s : (x, y) 7−→
(
− x
p
3
− 4C3,∆(s)
p
xp −3 −
4C3,∆(s)2p
3(xp −3)2 ,
ypp
−3
(−1
3
+ 4C3,∆(s)
p
(xp −3)2 +
8C3,∆(s)2p
3(xp −3)3
))
of degree 3p, such that
ψ23,∆,s = [ǫp3]πE3,∆,s and ψ3,∆,s =
1
r
(
π+ǫpp
)
for some integer r satisfying 3r 2 = 2p + ǫp tr(E3,∆,s ). The characteristic polynomial of
ψ3,∆,s is P3,∆,s (T )= T 2−ǫp rT+3p. The twisted endomorphismψ′3,∆,s on E ′3,∆,s satisfies
(ψ′3,∆,s )
2 = [−ǫp3]πE ′3,∆,s , andψ
′
3,∆,s = (−πE ′3,∆,s +ǫpp)/r , and P3,∆,s (ψ
′
3,∆,s )= 0.
Proof. Reduce E˜3,∆,s and φ˜3,∆,s mod p, compose with π0 as in §3, and apply Proposi-
tion 1 using Eq. (6.2). ⊓⊔
Proposition 4. Theorem 2 yields at least p −8 non-isomorphic curves (and counting
quadratic twists, at least 2p −16 non-Fp2 -isomorphic curves) equipped with efficient
endomorphisms.
Proof. The proof is exactly as for Proposition 3. ⊓⊔
6 As in Theorem 1, the particular value of ∆ is theoretically irrelevant.
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7 Cryptographic-sized curves
We will now exhibit some curves with our families with cryptographic parameter
sizes, and secure and twist-secure group orders. We computed the curve orders be-
low using Magma’s implementation of the Schoof–Elkies–Atkin algorithm [23,19,4].
First, consider the degree-2 curves of §5. By definition, E2,∆,s and its quadratic
twist E ′2,∆,s have points of order 2 over Fp2 : they generate the kernels of our endo-
morphisms. If p ≡ 2 (mod 3), then 2r 2 = 2p + ǫp tr(E ) implies tr(E ) 6≡ 0 (mod 3), so
when p ≡ 2 (mod 3) either p2− tr(E )+1= #E2,∆,s (Fp2 ) or p2+ tr(E )+1= #E ′2,∆,s (Fp2 )
is divisible by 3. However, when p ≡ 1 (mod 3) we can hope to find curves of order
twice a prime whose twist also has order twice a prime.
Example 1. Let p = 280 − 93 and ∆ = 2. For s = 4556, we find a twist-secure curve:
#E2,2,4556(Fp2 )= 2N and #E ′2,2,4556(Fp2 )= 2N ′ where
N = 730750818665451459101729015265709251634505119843 and
N ′ = 730750818665451459101730957248125446994932083047
are 159-bit primes. Proposition 2 lets us replace 160-bit scalar multiplications in
E2,2,4556(Fp2 ) and E
′
2,2,4556(Fp2 ) with 80-bit multiexponentiations.
Now, consider the degree-3 curves of §6. The order of E3,∆,s (Fp2 ) is always divis-
ible by 3: the kernel of ψ3,∆,s is generated by the rational point (3,C3,∆(s)). However,
on the quadratic twist, the nontrivial points in the kernel of ψ′3,∆,s are not defined
over Fp2 (they are conjugates over Fp2 ), so E
′
3,∆,s (Fp2 ) can have prime order.
Example 2. Let p = 2127−1; then ∆ = −1 is a nonsquare in Fp . The parameter value
s = 122912611041315220011572494331480107107 yields
#E3,−1,s (Fp2 )= 3 ·N and #E ′3,−1,s (Fp2 )=N ′,
where N is a 253-bit prime and N ′ is a 254-bit prime. Using Proposition 2, any scalar
multiplication in E3,−1,s (Fp2 ) or E
′
3,−1,s(Fp2 ) can be computed via a 127-bit multiex-
ponentiation.
Example 3. Let p = 2255−19; then ∆ = −2 is a nonsquare in Fp . The parameter s =
0x7516D419C4937E5E8F0761FDB9BB0382FE20E9D0B7AB6924BA1DA02561C5145E
yields #E3,−2,s (Fp2 ) = 3 ·N and #E3,−2,s (Fp2 ) = N ′, where N and N ′ are 509- and 510-
bit primes, respectively. Proposition 2 transforms any 510-bit scalar multiplication
in E3,−2,s (Fp2 ) or E
′
2,−2,s (Fp2 ) into a 255-bit multiexponentiation.
8 Montgomery, Twisted Edwards, and Doche–Icart–Kohelmodels
Montgomery models. The curve E2,∆,s has a Montgomery model over Fp2 if and only
if 2C2,∆(s) is a square in Fp2 (by [22, Proposition 1]): in that case, setting
B2,∆(s) :=
√
2C2,∆(s) and A2,∆(s)= 12/B2,∆(s),
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the birational mapping (x, y) 7→ (X /Z ,Y /Z ) =
(
(x−4)/B2,∆(s), y/B2,∆(s)2
)
takes us
from E2,∆,s to the projective Montgomery model
E
M
2,∆,s :B2,∆(s)Y
2Z = X
(
X 2+ A2,∆(s)X Z +Z 2
)
. (8.1)
(If 2C2,∆(s) is not a square, then EM2,∆,s is Fp2-isomorphic to the quadratic twist E
′
2,∆,s .)
These models offer a particularly efficient arithmetic, where we use only the X and
Z coordinates [20]. The endomorphism is defined (on the X and Z coordinates) by
ψ2,∆,s : (X : Z ) 7−→ (X 2p + A2,∆(s)pX pZ p +Z 2p :−2B2,∆(s)1−pX pZ p).
Twisted Edwardsmodels. Every Montgomery model corresponds to a twisted Ed-
wardsmodel (and vice versa) [2,16]. With u = X /Z and v = Y /Z , the birational maps
(u,v) 7−→ (x1,x2)=
(
u
v
,
u−1
u+1
)
and (x1,x2) 7−→ (u,v)=
(
1+ x2
1− x2
,
1+ x2
x1(1− x2)
)
take us between the Montgomery model of Eq. (8.1) and the twisted Edwardsmodel
E
TE
2,∆,s : a2(s)x
2
1 + x22 = 1+d2(s)x21x22 , where
{
a2(s) = (A2,∆(s)+2)/B2,∆(s)
d2(s) = (A2,∆(s)−2)/B2,∆(s).
Doche–Icart–Kohel models. Doubling-oriented Doche–Icart–Kohelmodels of elliptic
curves are defined by equations of the form
y2 = x(x2+Dx+16D).
These curves have a rational 2-isogeny φ, with kernel 〈(0,0)〉; in this form, we can
double more quickly by using the decomposition [2]=φ†φ (see [7, §3.1] for details).
Our curves E2,∆,s come equipped with a rational 2-isogeny, so it is natural to try
putting them in Doche–Icart–Kohel form. The isomorphism
α : (x, y) 7−→ (u,v)=
(
µ2(x+4),µ3y
)
with µ= 4
√
6/C2,∆(s)
takes us from E2,∆,s into a doubling-oriented Doche–Icart–Kohel model
E
DIK
2,∆,s : v
2 = u
(
u2+D2,∆(s)u+16D2,∆(s)
)
, where D2,∆(s)= 27/(1+ s
p
∆).
While EDIK2,∆,s is defined over Fp2 , the isomorphism is only defined over Fp2 (
√
1+ s
p
∆);
so if 1+ s
p
∆ is not a square in Fp2 then E
DIK
2,∆,s is Fp2 -isomorphic to E
′
2,∆,s .
The endomorphism ψDIK2,∆,s := αψ2,∆,sα−1 is Fp-isomorphic to the Doche–Icart–
Kohel isogeny, since they have the same kernel. The eigenvalue of ψ2,∆,s on cryp-
tographic subgroups is ±
p
±2, so computing [m]P as [a]P + [b]ψDIK2,∆,s with Doche–
Icart–Kohel doubling for [a] and [b] is like using a
p±2-adic expansion ofm.
Similarly, we can exploit the rational 3-isogeny on E3,∆,s for Doche–Icart–Kohel
tripling (see [7, §3.2]). The isomorphism (x, y) 7→ (u,v)=
(
a3,∆(s)(x/3−1),b3,∆(s)3y
)
,
with a3,∆(s)= 9/C3,∆(s) and b3,∆(s) = a3,∆(s)−1/2, takes us from E3,∆,s to the tripling-
oriented Doche–Icart-Kohel model
E
DIK
3,∆,s : v
2 = u3+3a3,∆(s)(u+1)2.
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9 Degree one: GLS as a degenerate case
Returning to the framework of §3, suppose E˜ is a curve defined over Q, and base-
extended to Q(
p
D): then E˜ = σE˜ , and we can apply the construction of §3 taking
φ˜ : E˜ → σE˜ to be the identity map. Reducing modulo an inert prime p, the endomor-
phism ψ is nothing but π0 (which is an endomorphism, since E is a subfield curve).
We have ψ2 = π20 = πE , so the eigenvalue of ψ is ±1 on cryptographic subgroups of
E (Fp2 ). Clearly, this endomorphism is of no use to us for scalar decompositions.
However, looking at the quadratic twistE ′ , the twisted endomorphismψ′ satisfies
(ψ′)2 =−πE ′ ; the eigenvalue ofψ′ on cryptographic subgroups is a square root of−1.
We have recovered the Galbraith–Lin–Scott endomorphism (cf. [12, Theorem 2]).
More generally, suppose φ˜ : E˜ → σE˜ is a Q-isomorphism: that is, an isogeny of
degree 1. If E˜ does not have CM, then σφ˜= ǫp φ˜−1, so ψ2 = [ǫp ]πE with ǫp =±1. This
situation is isomorphic to GLS. In fact, E˜ ∼= σE˜ implies j (E˜ )= j (σE˜ )= σj (E˜ ), so j (E˜ ) is
inQ, and E˜ is isomorphic to (or a quadratic twist of) a curve defined overQ. We note
that in the case d = 1, we have r =±t0 in Proposition 1, and the basis constructed in
the proof of Proposition 2 is (up to sign) the same as the basis of [12, Lemma 3].
While E ′(Fp2 ) may have prime order, E (Fp2 ) cannot: the points fixed by π0 form
a subgroup of order p +1− t0, where t20 −2p = tr(E ) (the complementary subgroup,
whereπ0 has eigenvalue−1, has order p+1+t0).We see that the largest prime divisor
of #E (Fp2 ) can be no larger than O(p). If we are in a position to apply the Fouque–
Lercier–Réal–Valette fault attack [10]—for example, if Montgomery ladders are used
for scalarmultiplication andmultiexponentiation—then we can solve DLP instances
in E ′(Fp2 ) inO(p
1/2) group operations (in the worst case!). WhileO(p1/2) is still expo-
nentially difficult, it falls far short of the ideal O(p) for general curves over Fp2 . GLS
curves should therefore be avoided where the fault attack can be put into practice.
10 Higher degrees
We conclude with some brief remarks onQ-curves of other small degrees. Hasegawa
provides a universal curve for d = 7 (and any ∆) in [15, Theorem 2.2], and our results
for d = 2 and d = 3 carry over to d = 7 in an identical fashion, though the endomor-
phism is slightly less efficient in this case (its defining polynomials are sextic).
For d = 5, Hasegawa notes that it is impossible to give a universal Q-curve for
every discriminant ∆: there exists a quadratic Q-curve of degree 5 over Q(
p
∆) if and
only if
(
5
/
pi
)
= 1 for every prime pi 6= 5 dividing ∆ [15, Proposition 2.3]. But this is
no problem when reducing modulo p, if we are prepared to give up the freedom of
choosing ∆: we could take ∆=−11 for p ≡ 1 (mod 4) and ∆=−1 for p ≡ 3 (mod 4),
and then use the curves defined in [15, Table 6].
Composite degree Q-curves (such as d = 6 and 10) promise more interesting re-
sults, as do exceptional CM specializations of the universal curves; we will return
to these cases in future work. Degrees greater than 10 yield less efficient endomor-
phisms, and so are less interesting from a practical point of view.
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